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work might lead to a richer debate and to a greater awareness of the possible biases
in the economic approach.1.
1 Introduction
Traditionallytherehavebeentwostreamsinthevastliteratureondistributivejustice.
On the one hand, there is the philosophical and economic literature, which tries to
findthebestinterpretationofjusticethroughrationaldiscussion andtheconstruction
offormalmodels. Ontheotherhand,thereis alargebodyof (mainlysociologicaland
psychological) empirical research on how people think about justice and how they
behave in actual distributional situations. These two streams of literature have been
almost completely disconnected. Economists and philosophers emphasize that "we
cannotexpecttosettleethicalissuesinasatisfactorymannerbyhavinga’vote’among
uninformed individuals. Rather, the arguments that are used for and against the
principle in question have to be examined carefully. (...) Essential ingredients of a
debate over normative issues are critical reflection and thorough assessment of the
argumentsbeingused"(Bossert[1998],p.283). Attheotherside,theresearchprogram
of most empirical social scientists starts from the idea that "past research has con-
vincingly shown that the notion of justice seems to mean different things to different
people and in different circumstances. Justice is like a greased pig, it yells loudly but
is hard to catch. In any event, the perennial search for the true meaning of justice has
not been particularly fruitful, and it is likely that there is no true or essential justice
beyond its socially constructed meanings" (Törnblom [1992], p. 177-178).
Although the gap between these two bodies of literature remains huge, some econ-
omists and philosophers have tried to bridge it. In the first place the interest in
experimental economics has been growing rapidly and it has been discovered that
distributive justice considerations cannot simply be discarded for the explanation of
behaviour. The ultimatum bargaining game is a case in point (see, e.g. Güth [1995]),
but many other examples can be given. In the second place, Elster [1992] started a
line of research in which information is collected on how distributional problems are
solved in the real world and how these real world solutions relate to theoretical
concepts. And in the third place economic journals have published the results of
questionnairestudiesaimedatinvestigatingwhethertheopinionsofeconomicagents
aboutjusticeareinlinewiththeassumptionsandaxiomsusedintheeconomicmodels.2.
While the first two lines of research focus on actual behaviour, the third line con-
centrates on opinions. It is therefore closer in spirit to the ethical and social choice
literature. In this paper I will concentrate on this third approach.
In section 2 I sketch a broad picture of the main empirical findings of the other social
sciences and contrast these with the current practice in applied welfare economics.
However,thiscurrentpracticeisnotreallyrepresentativefortherecentdevelopments
in the social choice literature. I will argue that these recent developments are much
more in line with the empirical work. In section 3 I discuss the influential paper by
YaariandBar-Hillel[1984]and showhowit startedalineof empiricalresearch which
runs parallel to the theoretical developments in the post-welfarist social choice lit-
erature. In section 4 I indicate how the work of Amiel and Cowell [1992] may act as
the starting point for an analogous development in the theory of inequality
measurement. I will then return in section 5 to the basic questions concerning the
usefulness of this empirical work.
This paper does not contain any original empirical work. At the same time, it is not
a real survey because there is no attempt at completeness. I have preferred to con-
centrateonafewstudiesanddiscusstheirmethodologyandrelevancyinsomedepth.
While it is true that I consider the Yaari-Bar-Hillel [1984] and Amiel-Cowell [1992]
papers as the most important and influential ones, the remainder of my discussion is
biased towards my own work. Moreover, I have chosen to focus on the more theor-
etical discussion about distributive justice within the social choice literature. I
therefore do not discuss another important line of empirical research, which started
withthepaperbyKahneman,KnetschandThaler[1986]andismoredirectedtowards
concrete decisions in a market environment.
2 Welfare economics vs the commonsense conception of justice
Let me first sketch a broad, primitive and somewhat provocative picture of two
approachestodistributivejustice. Thefirstisthecurrentpracticeinwelfareeconomics
or public economics: this is basically applied ethics as interpreted by mainstream
economics. Since developments in political philosophy or in social choice have only
aninfluence on public economics after a rather long delay, this current practice is not3.
representative for the current social choice literature. The second approach is what
Elster [1992] has described as "the commonsense conception of justice of unpro-
fessional philosophers". It refers to the feelings of the general public concerning
distributive justice. Empirical research by social scientists has made it possible to
build up a rough idea about these general feelings.
Take any handbook of welfare economics or public economics. Let us hope that it
reflectstheinsightsaboutthelimitationsof thesecondwelfaretheoremand therefore
introduces distributional considerations in an explicit way. It is almost certain that
consequentialism is accepted without much justification. Moreover (and hopefully
with somewhat more justification) social preferences are represented by a social
welfare function , increasing in the individual utility levels to satisfy the
Pareto-criterion. These sameutility functions are considered to be therepresentation
of the preferences guiding individual behaviour. As for the form of , it is fair to
saythattheappliedliteratureis stilllargelydominatedbyutilitarianism (orweighted
utilitarianism), although there is a chance that leximin is mentioned as a special case.
Most often (surely when there is a chapter on inequality measurement) the
Pigou-Dalton-axiomispresentedanddefended,statingthataredistributionofincome
froma richtoapoorpersonis welfareincreasing. AdaptingtheformulationofAmiel
and Cowell [1992], this principle is formulated as follows: "For an income vector y,
twoindividualsiandjandascalar ,if and ,thenyismoreunequal
(andyieldsalowerlevelofsocialwelfare)thanthevector ".
Other axioms are added to arrive at a formal measure of inequality, but this so-called
transfer axiom undoubtedly captures the most basic intuition of welfare economists.
To conclude: economists use a universalistic and formalized framework, rooted in
welfarism, but capturing some notion of inequality aversion.
Let us now turn to the opinions of the general public. Of course, it is difficult to
generalize because empirical evidence shows the existence of significant interindi-
vidualand interculturaldifferences (Törnblom[1992], Artsand vander Veen[1992]).
Butwe canstilltry todraw somegenerallines. In hisnice surveyarticle, Miller[1992]
has discussed in a nuanced way the main findings of empirical research in the social
sciencesinthelightofsome broaderphilosophicalideas. Butformy purposesamore
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primitive sketch will suffice. I restrict myself to three, rather robust findings with
respectto the opinions of Mr. Fairmind, an agentwho is representativeof thegeneral
public.
(a) Mr. Fairmind has a pluralistic conception of justice. Depending on the concrete
circumstances of the distributional problem, he will emphasize desert (or "equity" in
the psychological jargon), need or simple equality. There is some evidence that the
choice of the distributive criterion depends on the closeness of the social relations in
the relevant group. Productive effort will then be the dominant criterion if economic
productionis themaingoalof thesocial interaction;equalitywilldominateifthegoal
is the fostering of enjoyable social relations; in very close relations that aim at the
personal development of the individual persons, the need principle will play an
important role. One may wonder whether in the latter case we can still talk about
"justice" and whether there are no other values at play like altruism orfraternity. Yet
it is beyond doubt that most people do not work with a universal concept of justice,
but adjust their opinions to the concrete context of the problem.
(b) In judgments about the broader (macro)social situation the desert criterion plays
acrucialrole. Mostpeopleaccept thathighercontributionsmust berewarded. There
is a large consensus (at least in Western societies) that effort should be remunerated,
but the relative weight given to other components of desert may differ: some will
emphasize job characteristics (like responsibility or physically exerting circum-







(c) Thisdoes not meanthat Mr. Fairmindis happy about theincome inequality inour
society. Although he accepts income differences resulting from different contribu-
tions, he generally feels that actual income differences are too large. He is very much
in favour of introducing a minimum floor, below which no one should fall, and is5.
sensitive to the problem of social deprivation (more so in Europe than in the United
States). However, he wants to check whether the needy are really needy and is not
eager to guarantee an unconditional grant to those able-bodied persons who simply
choose not to work.
This sketch of the public opinion admittedly is very rough, but I am sure that it will
still be recognizable to many readers. It is clear that there is more than a small gap
between these opinions and the simple universalist and welfarist foundations of
welfareeconomics. Thereisayawningchasm. Isthisaproblem? Itsurelyisifwelfare
economists want their analysis to have real influence on the decisions taken in a
politicaldemocracy. Istheresomehopethatactualdevelopmentsinsocialchoicewill
helptobridgethegap? OrisMr.Fairmindsimplywrongandshouldhebeconvinced
of the truth which is hidden in the current economic practice? These latter questions
bring us right into the heart of the debate on the relationship between empirical
researchandtheoreticalthinkingaboutdistributivejustice. Iwillreturntothatdebate
in section 5.
As I emphasized already before, the social choice approach to distributive justice
differs from the current practice in public economics. Most of the empirical work
published in economic journals also departs from the research summarized before in
that it tries to link the questionnaire items more directly to the formal modelling
structureofthesocial choiceliterature. Theredoes existthereforeatleast apossibility
of sensible communication between this theoretical and this empirical work. In fact,
itwillturnoutthatthereisareasonableconvergencebetweenthetwo. Letmeillustrate
this first in section 3 for the post-welfarist developments within the social choice lit-
erature and then comment in section 4 on the measurement of inequality.
3 Mr. Fairmind is post-welfarist
The first really influential empirical article, co-authored by an economist and pub-
lishedinaneconomicjournal,wasthepaperbyYaariandBar-Hillel[1984]inthevery
first issue of Social Choice and Welfare. This paper did not contain any reference to the
large empirical literature sketched in the previous section but started instead from6.
economicandphilosophicalmodellingideas. Otherempiricalworkhasfollowedthis
lead. I will first discuss the limitations of welfarism and then turn to some recently
proposed alternatives.
[a] Against welfarism
To illustrate the methodology followed by Yaari and Bar-Hillel [1984], I will con-
centrate on one specific example from their paper, which is the most relevant in my
context. A group of undergraduate students was confronted with the following
question:
"Ashipmentcontaining12grapefruitand12avocadosistobedistributedbetweenJones
and Smith. The following information is given, and is known also to the two recipients:
-Doctors have determined that Jones’ metabolism is such that his body derives 100
milligrammes of vitamin F from each grapefruit consumed, while it derives no vitamin
F whatsoever from avocado.
-Doctors have also determined that Smith’s metabolism is such that his body derives 50
milligrammes of vitamin F from each grapefruit consumed and also from each avocado
consumed.
-Both persons, Jones and Smith, are interested in the consumption of grapefruit and/or
avocados only insofar as such consumption provides vitamin F- and the more the better.
All the other traits of the two fruits (such as taste, calorie content, etc.) are of no
consequence to them.
-No trades can be made after the division takes place.
How should the fruits be divided between Jones and Smith, if the division is to be just?"
They could choose between a number of given distributions which are based on
theoreticalmodelsorcould(iftheysodesired)addtheirownsolution. Anothergroup
of students got the following variant of the problem:
"Ashipmentcontaining12grapefruitand12avocadosistobedistributedbetweenJones
and Smith. The following information is given, and is known also to the recipients:
-Jones like grapefruit very much, and is willing to buy any number of them, provided
that the price does not exceed $1.00 per pound. He detests avocados, so he never buys
them.
-Smith likes grapefruit and avocados equally well, and is willing to buy both grapefruit
and avocado in any a number, provided that the price does not exceed $0.50 per pound.
-Jones and Smith are in the same income-tax bracket.
-No trades can be made after the division takes place.
How should the fruits be divided between Jones and Smith, if the division is to be just?"
Since the students in the different groups are selected in a random way, differences
inresponsepatternscanonlyfollowfromdifferencesintheformulationofthevariants.
In the former variant, Jones and Smith differ in their metabolism and therefore need
different amounts of the fruits to produce vitamin F. In the latter variant there is no7.
reference at all to needs: it is implicitly assumed that the differences in willingness to
pay (for two individuals at the same income level) reflect merely differences in sub-
jective tastes.
The results for the two variants are summarized in Table 1. The distributions have
beenchoseninsuchawaythattheycorrespondtowell-knownsolutionconcepts. The
division(J:8-0,S:4-12)wherethefirstnumbercorrespondstothenumberofgrapefruit
and the second to the number of avocados would be advocated by the maximin
criterion-butalsobybargainingfromzeroaccordingtotheKalai-Smorodinskymodel.
Utilitarianism(butalsocompetitiveequilibriumfromequalsplitandbargainingfrom
zero according to the Nash-model) would lead to the division (J:12-0, S:0-12). The
results show that the first (maximin) solution dominates in the needs-case and that
the second (utilitarian) solution is more popular in the tastes-case.
Table 1. Needs versus tastes
(Yaari and Bar-Hillel [1984])
NEEDS TASTES
(N=163) (N=122)
J:6-6, S:6-6 8% 9%
J:6-0, S:6-12 0% 4%
J:8-0, S:4-12 82% 28%
J:9-0, S:3-12 8% 24%
J:12-0, S:0-12 2% 35%
Onecouldusethiskindofresultstoevaluatetheacceptabilityofthedifferentsolution
concepts,butthisisnot themost interestingorrobustconclusionwhich canbedrawn
from table 1. Much more important is the simple fact that the distribution of the
responses in the two columns is completely different. This is not at all surprising in
thelightofpreviousempiricalresearch:itsimplyshowsthatIsraelistudentsreactlike
the majority of the population in Western societies. But the strength of the8.
Yaari-Bar-Hillel-paperliesin itsformalization. Indeed,the casehasbeenconstructed
in such a way that the two variants are formally identical. What has to be distributed
is the same (12 grapefruit and 12 avocados), and the individual "utility functions" of
Jones and Smith also are the same in both cases with (in an obvious notation)
Of course, the content of the utility functions is different. While in the former case
the functions and give information about the needs of Jones and Smith, in the
lattercasetheycarryinformationabouttheirtastes. Foranunreconstructedwelfarist,
however, these differences in information should be irrelevant, since the only thing
that matters is the level of welfare and not the exact source or interpretation of that
welfare. Given the formal structure of the problem, a welfarist respondent therefore
should pick the same division in both cases. Israeli students clearly did not behave
in a welfarist fashion: it did matter a lot to them whether the problem was described
in terms of needs or in terms of tastes.
Notonly was the formalstructure of the questions familiarto economists. Moreover,
the paper came exactly at the right moment, because its publication coincided with a
growingtendency inthe socialchoiceliteratureto departfrom simple(universalistic)
welfarismandto turntomorespecificandcontext-dependenttheoriesof distributive
justice. Later empirical work by Gaertner [1992, 1994], also based on a careful for-
malization, has confirmed that it is nearly impossible to rationalize respondents’
behaviour in terms of utilitarian ethics. All this raises the obvious question: do the
more recent developments in social choice theory succeed in bridging part of the gap
between the theory and Mr. Fairmind’s opinions? I will look at some relevant results
in the following section, leaving aside the question whether bridging that gap would
be a good thing. To that question I return in section 5.
[b] Context-dependent approaches and equality of opportunity
In Schokkaert and Overlaet [1989] the limitations of welfarism are taken for granted.
They did not attempt to check the popularity of a universalistic ethical theory, but
vJ = 100gr
vS = 50gr +50av
vJ vS9.
immediately turned to some specific models. One of these models was the surplus
sharing problem, as analysed in Moulin [1987] (see also Moulin [1988]). This pure
distributionproblemisformulatedbyMoulin[1987]asfollows:"Afixed,finitenumber
of agents enter a joint venture, generating a monetary return. Utility is fully trans-
ferable by monetary side payments. Knowing the individual opportunity costs and
the total returns and assuming there is a surplus, how should we divide it?" This
problem has two interesting aspects from the viewpoint of the relationship between
empirical and theoretical work. In the first place, it is set within a production context
forwhichuninformedrespondentsusuallyhavethestrongestintuitions. Inthesecond
place, Moulin [1987] has shown that the equal and proportional sharing rules are the
only solutions satisfying a set of reasonable axioms. These are also the two most
popular solutions in the empirical work. This is really one of the places where
economic and psychological models of distributive justice can meet each other.
Schokkaert and Overlaet [1989] worked within the quasi-experimental setting used
also by Yaari and Bar-Hillel [1984]. Different groups of Belgian undergraduate stu-
dents were confronted with one of the four variants (aP, bP, aL, bL) of the following
question:
"John and Peter are glassblowers and set up a business together.
(a) John works five days a week and Peter only four.
(b)Johnis artisticallymore gifted than Peterand couldtherefore earn elsewhere ahigher
income.
Theirwork is complementary and they both are absolutely indispensable. John has a net
income of 500 000 BEF a year and Peter earns 400 000 BEF.
(P)Afterayeartheyhavegotasalesrevenueof990000BEF,sothattheyafterdeduction
of their wages have realized a profit of 90 000 BEF. What would you consider to be a
just division of this profit?
(L)Afterayeartheyhavegotasalesrevenueof810000BEF,sothattheyafterdeduction
of their wages, have incurred a los of 90 000 BEF. What would you consider to be a just
division of this loss?"
TheresultsaresummarizedinTable 2. Lookfirstattheresultsforthesurplus-variants
aP and bP. It is obvious that proportional and equal sharing are indeed the focal
solutions of that problem, attracting 97.5% of the respondents in the first and 87.8%
inthesecondcase. Again,thisisnotreallysurprisinginthelightofpreviousempirical
research. Itisimportant,however,thatMoulin’stheoreticalworkyieldsatightformal
structure and a nice theoretical interpretation for these "empirical" solutions. Equal
sharingis thenaturalsolutionwhenweviewthemodelasacooperativegame,where10.
intermediate coalitions generate no surplus but the grand coalition does. Since
cooperation of all agents is necessary to generate the surplus, they all have an equal
right to it. Proportional sharing follows when we interpret the model as a pricing
problemandassumethatthesurplusdependsontheopportunitycostsofthedifferent
agents. The question still remains under what conditions one interpretation is to be
preferredovertheother. TheresultsinTable 2(inlinewithpreviousempiricalwork)
suggest that this may depend on the causes of the productivity differences. If there
is a clear quantitative indication of differences in effort, respondents choose the
opportunity cost interpretation. However, if differences in productivity follow from
differences in natural talent, the case for using the proportional solution is much less
obvious. In fact, in that case there is almost a 50%/50% split among the respondents.
Table 2.  Surplus sharing and the division of a loss
(Schokkaert and Overlaet [1989])
SURPLUS LOSS
EFFORT TALENT EFFORT TALENT
(aP) (bP) (aL) (bL)
John>50000 2.5% 12.2% John>50000 0.0% 4.8%
John 50000 82.5% 36.6% John 50000 41.0% 51.2%
(proportional) (proportional)
John 45000 15.0% 51.2% John 45000 48.7% 36.6%
(equal) (equal)
John<Peter 0.0% 0.0% John<Peter 10.3% 7.2%
LetusnowturntotheresultsforthevariantsaLandbL,wherethecooperativeventure
incurs a loss. This problem of division of a loss is formally similar to the surplus
sharing model. However, the respondents do not react in a symmetric way. This
effect is especially striking in variant aL: while 82.5% of the respondents choose a
proportionaldivisioninthesurplus-variant,only41.0%doessoforaloss. Thismeans
that about 60% of the respondents prefer a division rule where the final income dis-11.
tribution is no longer proportional to the number of days worked by the agents. This
asymmetrybetweengainsandlossesisageneralfindinginempiricalwork(Törnblom
[1992]). ItwasalsofoundbyKahnemanetal.[1986]intheiranalysisoftheperceptions
of entitlements in the market. Again: Belgian students react like the majority of the
population in Western societies. Apparently the intuitions of respondents do not
satisfytheusualconsistency(orpath-independency)axiomswhichareoftenimposed
in formal work as a requirement of rationality.
Whataretheimplicationsofthisfinding? Onecanreduceittoakindofframingeffect
and claim that it is due to the noncommittal setting of a questionnaire study and
therefore will disappear in the real world. But this is perhaps too easy as an escape
route. There is also another interpretation. The problem of loss division is not a
one-step problem. As it is formulated, the agents first get an income and only after a
year they realize that there is a loss. In a certain sense one can say that they have
"acquired a claim" to this original income. It is possible that in the mind of the
respondents these claims are equally valued for both agents and that therefore an
"equal"sacrificeinthecaseofalossisjustified. Evenifonewouldseethisasaframing
effect, it is difficult to deny that it does play a role in real world division problems.
Thechoice of a referencepointis not a slight detail:it probably is anessential element
for a complete formulation of the problem of distributive justice in the real world.
The shift towards more specific and context-dependent theorizing has not prevented
theappearanceofnewmoregenerallinesofthoughtwithinthesocialchoiceliterature.
One of the most promising developments has been the introduction of responsibility
and the (re)discovery of the notion of equality of opportunity. An overview of this
literatureisgivenbyFleurbaey[1998]. Inthisapproachadistinctionismadebetween
two sets of individual characteristics: those for which individuals can be held
responsible,and those for whichtheyare not responsible. Ifdifferences in theformer
lead to differences in economic status, there is no problem from the point of view of
justice. However,ifdifferencesineconomicstatusfollowfromdifferencesinthelatter
category of characteristics, compensation is necessary. This approach raises two12.
groupsof questions. First,howtodetermineforwhichcharacteristicsindividuals are
responsible and for which they are not? And second, given that we have solved this
problem, how then to formalize the notion of equality of opportunity?
Thefirstquestionbringsusbacktothewholedebateaboutthereasonsfor(in)equality.
One can try to answer it in abstract terms. Yet it is interesting to remember that this
is also one of the main research topics in the empirical literature. The starting point
of theories of equality of opportunity is perfectly in line with the opinions of Mr.
Fairmindandweknow moreorlesshis ideasaboutthisclassification. Rememberthe
differencesbetweentheresultsforthecaseofeffortandthecaseoftalentinthesurplus
sharingproblem. Some theorists(Roemer[1993]) haveevensuggestedthat empirical
research might be crucial in the process of classifying variables for which individuals
have to bear responsibility. Indeed, this classification may be different in different
societies, because it will be influenced by the dominant physiological, psychological
or social theories of man. Of course, to be really interesting from this point of view,
the empirical work should not be restricted to student samples. Some results with
representative(non-student)samplesareshowninSchokkaertandLagrou[1983]and
Schokkaert and Capéau [1991] and they are broadly consistent with the picture from
section 2. According to the respondents, individual efforts have to be remunerated.
However, there is no consensus about the classification of natural abilities. In that
sense, the community of ordinary people resembles very much the community of
philosophers. There seems to be ample room for interaction between empirical and
theoretical work here.
The second set of questions arizes after the decision on the classification of variables
has been taken. What does it exactly mean to "compensate persons for the variables
for which they are not responsible" while at the same time "allowing for differences
in economic status following from factors for which they are responsible"? An
interestingapproachtothesequestionshasbeenproposedbyFleurbaey(summarized
inFleurbaey [1998]). A quasi-linearversionof the problemis analysedin Bossertand
Fleurbaey [1996] in the context of income (re)distribution. The basic intuitions of the
equal opportunities-approach are summarized with two axioms. These can be
formulated loosely in verbal terms as follows:13.
EIER (equal income for equal responsibility-characteristics): two agents with
identicalresponsibility-characteristicsshouldendupwithidenticalpost-taxincomes.
Indeed,theyonlydifferincharacteristicsforwhichtheyarenotresponsible,andthese
differences should not be reflected in their final economic status.
ETES (equal transfer for equal compensation-characteristics): two agents with
identicalvalues for thecharacteristics for whichcompensation is justified should pay
the same tax or receive the same transfer. Indeed, in this way differences in pre-tax
incomes which follow from responsibility characteristics are kept intact throughout
the taxation process.
These two axioms apparently formalize in a plausible way the basic insights of the
equal opportunities-approach. Let us therefore turn to the results of an empirical
study which investigated the degree to which they are accepted by a sample of stu-




income is composed as follows. Barbara and Babette receive a basic income of 200 each
for their labour. Due to their lower productivity Ann and Anna receive a lower basic
income of 150 per person. These differences in productivity result from differences in
innate intelligence: Barbara and Babette are more intelligent than Ann and Anna. The
situationiscomplicated bythefactthatBarbaraand Annarehard workersandtherefore
haveahigherproductivity. Thisextraproductivityisremuneratedwithanextraincome
of 150 each. Babette and Anna are lazy and do not have this extra productivity. They
do not receive an extra income. The government wants to redistribute the income of
these four people. The knowledge that there will be a redistribution does not change the
behaviour of the individuals. What would you consider to be a just redistribution?"
As in Yaari and Bar-Hillel [1984] the respondents received a table with different
possible distributions. Some of these corresponded to popular views among unin-
formed respondents: proportionality, egalitarianism or moderate income progres-
sivity. Some other distributions satisfied either EIER or ETES or both. Note that the












the difference in effort), while the less intelligent Ann and Anna receive a transfer of
25(yieldingpost-taxincomesof325and175respectively). Thehard-workingBarbara
and Ann then get the same after-tax income 325, the lazy Babette and Anna receive
175. This is not an easy solution and it is definitely very different from the popular
proportional or egalitarian solutions. Next to this (theoretically ideal) solution there
are of course many other options where one of the two axioms is satisfied but not the
other.
Schokkaert and Devooght (1998) also constructed a similar case within a different
context: compensation for health expenditures. The case ran as follows:
"Chris, John, Tim and Tom suffer from similar effects of lung cancer. The total cost for
a succesful cure is 350 for Chris, 200 for John, 300 for Tim and 150 for Tom. The total
costs are composed as follows. To help Tim and Tom the cost for the basic cure is 150
each. To help Chris and John the cost for the basic treatment is 200 each, due to their
lowernaturalresistanceagainstcancer. ChrisandJohnhaveageneticdefectandtherefore
needadditionaltreatment. ThisisnotnecessaryforTimandTom. Thereisalsoasecond
reason for the difference in costs. Tim and Chris have chosen a very expensive doctor,
which costs them each 150 extra. Tom and John have not chosen such an expensive
doctor. We suppose that all treatments are effective. The government has to divide 500
for the treatments among these patients and wants to spend this amount completely.
What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of money?"
The formal structure is completely similar. In this case stands for the medical
expenditures, the responsibility-variable is the choice of doctor, the compensa-
tion-variable is the natural resistance against cancer. Again, there is a solution
satisfying both axioms EIER and ETES but this solution is not straightforward for an
unsophisticated respondent.
The results for the two cases are summarized in Table 3. We only look at the degree
of acceptance of the axioms. More detailed information can be found in Schokkaert
and Devooght [1998]. Look first at the results for the health case. More than half of
the respondents pick the complicated solution satisfying ETES and EIER. This
suggests that the equal opportunities-framework is more succesful than other for-
malizations in capturing the basic intuitions of uninformed respondents. Note that







Table 3.  Acceptance of Fleurbaey’s axioms
(Schokkaert and Devooght [1998])
HEALTH INCOME
ETES Not ETES ETES Not ETES
EIER 56.3% 8.3% EIER 14.6% 1.0%
Not EIER 15.6% 19.8% Not EIER 10.3% 74.1%
However, the results for the income distribution case are strikingly different. Only a
minority chooses the Fleurbaey-solution. One can think of at least three possible
explanations and theyall pointto interesting lines of research. The most obvious one
relates to the classification issue. We defined EIER and ETES as if "intelligence" were
a compensation-variable and "effort" a responsibility-variable. But we know already
from section 2 that there is definitely no consensus about the former statement and
this will have its bearing on the responses. The second possible explanation also
follows from what we know about Mr. Fairmind: he is concerned about incentive
considerations. Yet the Bossert-Fleurbaey [1986]framework is first-best and neglects
thisissue completely. The third explanation is more of a framing effect. It is possible
thatrespondentsanswerthequestionwithreal-worldtaxationschemesintheirmind.
Progressive income taxation schemes are defined with respect to income levels and
do not takeintoaccount differences in effort orin natural abilities. Note that allthese
explanations can help to understand the difference between the income- and the
health-case. In the latter case, the classification in responsibility- and compensa-
tion-variablesislessdebatable,incentiveconsiderationsplayonlyamarginalroleand
there is no real-world tax analogue.
Much more should be done to explore further the relationship between theories of
equal opportunities and the moral intuitions of uninformed respondents. Yet there
is room for a dialogue between the two approaches. While the simple welfarist
approaches are so far removed from Mr. Fairmind’s feelings that fruitful communi-16.
cation is impossible, this is definitely not true for these recent post-welfarist devel-
opments. This is also illustrated in a somewhat surprising way by a recent paper of
Konow [1996]. This author formulates what he calls a "positive" theory of fairness,
based principally on the results of a set of questionnaire studies both with students
and with non-students. While he does not refer in any way to the social choice lit-
erature, his approach crucially hinges on what he has baptized the "accountability
principle", formulated as follows: "The entitlement varies in direct proportion to the
value of the participant’s relevant discretionary variables, ignoring other variables,
butdoesnot holda participant accountablefor differencesin thevaluesof exogenous
variables". These latter variables are interpreted as being beyond the control of the
participants. Or: how an "uninformed" economist reinvents some basic principles of
the recent social choice literature on the basis of his empirical findings with "unin-
formed" respondents.
4 Mr. Fairmind cares about inequality, but in a complex way
Aconcretetopicfortheevaluationofdistributivejusticeisthemeasurementofincome
inequality. Economistshaveattackedthisprobleminaformalizedwayandproposed
a whole battery of axioms to characterize various specific measures. It is not always
obvious how one should choose between these axioms (and hence measures) and
thereforestochasticdominanceresultshavebeenparticularlyusefulinthisfield. Until
recentlythe literaturefocused onthe caseof homogeneous householdsdiffering only
in their income level. So doing one avoids the difficult problems described in the
previous section. However, as soon as one starts analysing the heterogeneous case,
one immediately gets confronted with these same questions (see, e.g., Shorrocks
[1995]). In this section we will only comment on the homogeneous case.
In a series of papers Amiel and Cowell have investigated whether the theoretical
axioms proposed in the economic literature are accepted by student samples in dif-
ferent European countries and in the United States. I will concentrate on the results
in their most influential paper and in its direct extension (Amiel and Cowell [1992],17.
[1994a]). AgeneraloverviewoflaterworkisgiveninAmielandCowell[1998]. Other
authorshavefollowedtheirtrackandbasically haveconfirmedmost of theirfindings
(Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo [1993], Harrison and Seidl [1994]).
As described in section 2, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle plays a crucial role in
this literature. I will therefore first focus on the results with respect to that axiom.
Amiel and Cowell constructed a questionnaire in which they first ask respondents to
rank vectors of numbers, representing income levels, and in a second stage confront
the respondents with a verbal formulation of the axiom. The verbal questions come
after the numerical ones and respondents can, if they desire, change their ranking of
the income vectors after having been exposed to the axioms in plain English. This
opportunity was taken by only a few students. In Amiel and Cowell [1992] the
numerical question with respect to the transfer principle runs as follows:
"...youareaskedto compare two distributionsofincome. Please statewhich ofthem you
consider to be the more unequally distributed by circling A or B. If you consider that
both of the distributions have the same inequality then circle both A and B.
(...)
A= (1, 4, 7, 10, 13) B= (1, 5, 6, 10, 13)"
It is obvious that acceptance of the principle implies that distribution B is more equal
than distribution A. In fact, distribution B strictly Lorenz-dominates distribution A.
For the verbal question, they choose the following formulation:
"Suppose we transfer income from a person who has more income to a person who has
less,withoutchanginganyone else’sincome. After thetransferthepersonwhoformerly
had more still has more.
(a) Income inequality in this society has fallen.
(b) The relative position of others has also changed as a consequence of this transfer.
Therefore we cannot say, a priori, how inequality has changed.
(c) Neither of the above."
In a later paper Amiel and Cowell [1994a] explored the relationship between the
specification of the social welfare function and the evaluation of inequality. As they
emphasize (in line with the results in the previous section), it is possible that people
donotviewincomeinequalityin"welfarist"terms. Inthatcasedirectquestionsabout
measurement of inequality will not necessarily lead to the same response pattern as
questionsreferringtoasocialwelfarefunction. Thenumericalquestionforthewelfare
evaluation goes as follows:18.
"InAlfalandtwoeconomicprogrammesareproposed. Itisknownthatbothprogrammes
will have thesame effect on the population except on their incomes and all the people are
identical in every respect other than income. (...) there are given two alternative lists of
incomes A and B (in Alfaland local currency) which result from these two programmes
respectively. Please state which programme you consider would make the community
of Alfaland better off by circling A or B. If you consider that each of the programmes is
just as good as the other then circle A and B.
(...)
A= (1, 4, 7, 10, 13) B= (1, 5, 6, 10, 13)"
Here also, they have a verbal question:
"Suppose there are two economic programmes A and B which have only the following
difference: the income of person i in programme A is x units higher than his income in
programme B while the income of person j in programme A is x units lower than his
income in programme B. In both programmes the income of person i is higher than the
income of person j. The incomes of all other people are unaffected by the choice of pro-
gramme A or programme B.
(a) Programme A would make the community better off.
(b) Programme B would make the community better off.
(c) Therelativepositionof otherpeople isalso differentbyAand B. Therefore we cannot
say which programme would make the community better off.
(d) None of the above."
The results for these different questions are summarized in table 4. The results on
inequality measurement are based on the answers of 941 students from different
universities: North Texas, Southern Methodist University, London School of Econ-
omics, Bonn, Karlsruhe, Koblenz, Ruppin Institute and Hebrew University. The
answers for the social welfare functions are from 620 students from Bonn, Koblenz,
Stockholm,London SchoolofEconomicsandTelAviv. The popularityofthetransfer
principle turns out to be remarkably low, given the extremely simple question: only
one third of the respondents thinks that distribution B is more equal than
distribution A! It is interesting to look at a special case. One subgroup (81 students
from Hebrew University) had been taught about the Lorenz-curve before they took
the questionnaire: 89% of this subgroup supported the transfer principle in its verbal
statement. But even in this group only 40% stated that distribution B was the more
equal one when they had to rank the vectors. Either these students were not so good
afterall,ortheirintuitionsagainstthePigou-Daltonprincipleareratherstrongindeed.
What to conclude from these results? The Pigou-Dalton criterion is so important in
the economic tradition that economists understandably are reluctant to give it up. It
is indeed almost tautological to state that in a two-person society a transfer from a19.
Table 4.  Acceptance of the transfer principle




rich to a poor person decreases inequality. However, things change in a society with
more than two persons. If one takes the (defensible) position that the degree of
inequality is (co)determined by thedistances betweenthe different incomepositions,
it is no longer obvious that the income vector (1, 5, 6, 10, 13) is more equal than (1, 4,
7,10,13). Forinstance:thedistancebetweenthelowestandthesecondlowestincome
is larger in the former than in the latter case. In fact, Amiel and Cowell [1998]remind
usthatPigouhimselfhaddoubtsabouttheapplicationoftheprincipleinthisbroader
context. Theyquotehimasstatingin"WealthandWelfare"[1912]:"...ifthesemembers
are only two in number, it is easily shown that any transfer from the richer to the
poorer of the two...must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. In a community
consisting of more than two members, the meaning of rendering the distribution of
thedividendlessunequalisambiguous". ItwasDaltonwhoextendedtheapplication
of the principle to a population of arbitrary size.
The upshot of this discussion is clear. Although there may be good a priori reasons
to accept the Pigou-Dalton criterion in its strong form, this goes further than Pigou’s
original intuition. It also goes further than the intuitions of large groups of respon-
dents. It might therefore be fruitful to try to devise a refined interpretation of the
original insight. As Amiel and Cowell [1998] suggest it may make sense to recast the
measurement of inequality in terms of income differences, rather than basing it on a
comparison of individual income levels. Here lies an interesting avenue for further
theoretical research.20.
The need for refinement, rather than rejection, also follows from the investigation of
another crucial principle: that of monotonicity. In the social welfare questionnaire,
the respondents were asked to evaluate the social welfare level obtained by two
economic programmes yielding the following income distributions in Alfaland:
I:   A= (5, 5, 5, 5) B= (5, 5, 5, 10)
II:  A= (4, 8, 9) B= (4, 8, 20)
III: A= (5, 5, 5, 5) B= (5, 5, 5, 30)
In each of these cases income distribution B dominates income distribution A. The
usual (primitive) application of the Pareto principle would therefore result in a
preference for B. The principle was also formulated in verbal terms as follows:
"Suppose there are two economic programmes A and B which have only one difference:
there is one person whose income under programme B is higher than under programme
A. For every other person his income under programme B equals his income under
programme A.
(a) Programme B would make the community better off because no one is worse off and
someone is better off.
(b) TherelativepositionofothersisalsodifferentasbetweenAandB;thereforewecannot
say, a priori, which programme is better off.
(c) Neither of the above."
Table 5 summarizes the results with the student samples. These results are remark-
able: the most basic efficiency principle seems to be rejected by about 50% of the
respondents!
Table 5.  Acceptance of monotonicity






Is this the end of Pareto? Of course not, as Amiel and Cowell [1994b] themselves
argue. These results only point out the need to distinguish more carefully between
different concepts. Monotonicity implies that social welfare is increasing in any21.
income. The Pareto principle means that social welfare is increasing in any utility
level. The two only coincide if individual utility functions have own income as their
only argument and are strictly increasing in that income. If there are externalities in
the income distribution then monotonicity is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
Paretoprinciple. But theseexternalities can beexpected. In fact, itcan be arguedthat
they are the basic justification for the whole analysis. What would be the point of
trying to measure income inequality if the income distribution did not matter to the
individualmembersofsociety? Whatcomesunderattackthroughtheresultsintable 5
therefore is not the Pareto principle as a dominance criterion in the space of utilities,
butrathertheprimitiveinterpretationwhichissometimesgiventotheutilityfunctions
in applied work. Note that the interpretation in terms of externalities is perfectly
consistent with the increasing rate of rejection of monotonicity when we go from
variant I to variant III.
5 Why empirical research?
Let me now return to the basic question of the interrelationship between empirical
research on opinions and normative economics. I definitely think that there is room
fortwo-waycommunicationhereandIamconvincedthatphilosophicalandeconomic
insights may be useful (or even necessary) to overcome the "feeling of intellectual
disorganization"which characterizesat leastpartof thepsychological work(Deutsch
[1983]). ButinthissectionIwillonlypresentsomegeneralargumentsontheusefulness
of empirical work for normative thinking. A more complete discussion can be found
in Bell and Schokkaert [1992], Miller [1994] and Swift [1993].
A first argument is obvious. The ultimate aim of normative economics is to be put in
practice. The opinions or preferences of the citizens will determine the social context
within which this has to be achieved. The social support for a particular policy pro-
posalisthereforecrucialtoitsfeasibility. Empiricalresearchgivesinformationonthe
acceptanceofnotionsofjusticebydifferentsocialgroups. Economistsworkingwithin
the traditional welfare economic approach based on a utilitarian social welfare
function(or,worseeven,reasoninginafirst-bestsettingandneglectingdistributional
matters) should not be surprised that they often have difficulties to convey some of22.
their policy proposals. Mr. Fairmind has strong feelings about the relationship
between inequality and efficiency or about the remuneration of effort. It is possible
that he is wrong from an ethical perspective. But in that case, economists have to
convince him if they want to implement their "correct" conception of justice. And for
those who want to convince him, a better insight into the structure of his uninformed
opinions may be extremely useful.
I would even argue (but I know that this is debatable) that it is an essential element
of a theory of justice in a democratic society that it can be explained to the citizens.
Justice is about the basic institutions of society and Mr. Fairmind should have its say
aboutthesebasicinstitutions. Tohaveademocraticdebateaboutthecontentofjustice
is in itself an essential component of justice. Of course, this does not imply auto-
maticallythatempiricalresearchonuninformedopinionsisneeded-butsuchresearch
mayhelptostructurethedebateandtomaketheoreticalthinkersawareofthespecific
features of their own approach. It may therefore improve communication and con-
tribute to the spread of new ideas.
Thisbringsusalready closeto a moredifficultquestion. Cantheoretical thinkers and
philosophers learn something substantial from the empirical results? The answer is
necessarilypositive, as soon asempirical elementsare made a constitutive part of the
definition of justice itself. Remember Roemer’s cultural relativism concerning the
exact definition of the factors for which individuals are to be held responsible. But
what about the justification of that basic definition? I fully agree with Bossert [1998]
that "the essential ingredients of a debate over normative issues are critical reflection
and thorough assessment of the arguments being used" and that a simple vote over
different options will not do. Yet this begs the real question:is it not possible that the
empirical work suggests some useful arguments, enriching the theoretical debate?
Miller[1994]followsinthisrespectanambitiouslineofargumentationinwhichthere
is a strong complementarity between empirical and theoretical work. He argues
against a Platonic conception of justice where true knowledge can be attained by
special methods of reasoning accessible only to the trained theorist (a philosopher in
his case), and in favour of a so-called Aristotelian approach where the task of the
philosopher is one of "identifying and clarifying what people ordinarily mean when23.
they invoke justice". This is very much related to Rawls’s idea of a "reflective equi-
librium", which is also the main inspiration for Yaari and Bar-Hillel [1984] in their
justificationoftheempiricalwork. Ofcourse,thepurposeofthephilosophicalexercise
isnottoformulateasimplesummaryofthemajoritypositioninsociety:itistoconfront
theoretical ideas with a priori intuitions to arrive at a consistent position. Empirical
research may then become an important element in the process of weighing different
considerations to arrive at a reasonable judgment: "Looking at what other people
believe about justice, and in particular trying to understand when people disagree
andwhatthegroundsoftheirdisagreementare,areintegraltotheprocessofdeciding
which of my own beliefs deserve to be taken as ’the fixed points of my considered
judgment’" (Miller [1994]). Empirical results are a valuable (and perhaps even
necessary)inputinthetheoreticaldebate,nottobeappliedinakindofvotingscheme,
butbecause they may help the theorist to understand better the origin(and hence the
strengths and limitations) of different justice conceptions. At the very least they may
help the theorist to avoid some dangerous traps. Let me go somewhat deeper into
this latter point, because it can also be valuable for people who are not convinced at
all by Miller’s Aristotelian conception.
The first trap for the normative economist (or philosopher) lies in a lack of awareness
about the influence of his own social background. Consider a modal social choice
theorist. Thismodal choicetheorist ismale, witha university degree,with anincome
well above average but at the same time well below the top, probably rather indi-
vidualistic and intellectually ambitious. He is definitely not representative for the
population at large. We know from the empirical research that there are large
interindividual differences in opinions about justice and that these can be related
(albeitin animperfect way)to the socialposition of respondents. The atypical profile
ofthe socialchoicetheorist willthenbe reflectedin hisopinions. These opinionsmay
stillbe the"correct"ones,buta greaterawarenessof socialinfluences(also onhisown
frameofthinking)couldcertainlyhelphimtobemorecautiousinformulatingatheory
of justice, which is to be generalized for the society at large. Note moreover that this
modalsocialchoicetheoristisstronglyinfluencedbytheGreekheritageintheWestern
culture. Ingeneralheisnotveryeagertobeconfrontedwithinterculturaldifferences,
but again: he is better aware of them.24.
Unless intellectuals in one way or another escape from the psychological regularities
which characterize the behaviour of all other citizens, they run the danger of falling
into a second trap. When discussing the acceptability of axioms or the applicability
of specific models, theorists often refer to typical cases. They like to tell revealing
stories about shipwrecked people in a lifeboat or about sons dividing the bequest of
their father. As we know that the intuitions of Mr. Fairmind will depend on the
concrete social relations within the group, the same is probably to some extent true
for the theorist. Whether this context-dependency is a real component of justice or a
mere framing effect to be corrected for, the theorist is better aware of this kind of
influences.
The third trap is perhaps the most dangerous one. Social choice theorists are part of
a scientific community where model-building skills are highly rewarded and where
the ability to formulate a problem in mathematical terms helps very much in being
takenseriously. Whilethis is in generala good thing, it has thedisadvantage that the
availability of techniques partly determines the research agenda. Empirical research
may then be helpful to open the roll-down shutters of what otherwise could become
aclosedhouse. Theprevioussectionsgivetwogoodexamples. Itisdifficulttoexplain
thepopularitywithineconomicsofsimplewelfarismifonedoesnottakeintoaccount
its practical advantages for the analysis of public policy. Think about the optimal
taxation literature. And an analogous point can be made with respect to the Pigou-
Dalton criterion. This principle has become so strongly embedded in the economic
tradition, partly because it can be translated easily in mathematical terms. But even
Pigou himself had doubts about its generality and there are good (a priori) reasons
for these doubts. Amiel and Cowell’s results may then act as an eye-opener, or: as an
antidote for the blinding effect of popular formal models and available techniques.
Of course this does not at all mean that the empirical results would suggest that
theories of justice and of inequality measurement should be formulated in a less
mathematical way. The bias resides not in the desire of formalization as such, but in
the uncritical acceptance of the limitations of well-known techniques.25.
6 Conclusion
The ideasabout distributive justice of the populationin our Western democracies are
in strong conflict with the simple welfarist objective functions used by welfare
economists. Mr. Fairmind follows a context-dependent approach with strong
emphasisonanotionofdesertandwithspecialconcernforthepoor. Thisisarelevant
findingifeconomistswanttheirpolicyprescriptionstobeputinpractice. Atthesame
time the gap is so large that there is hardly any communication possible between
empirical research on the one hand and traditional welfare economics on the other
hand.
However, recently we have witnessed a number of important developments in the
socialchoiceliterature. Welfarismhasbeenreinterpretedinamoresophisticatedway,
to the point that it is put bluntly that, if welfarism can be salvaged philosophically,
traditional welfare economics cannot (Mongin and d’Aspremont [1996]). Game
theorists have developed context-dependent approaches to distributive justice. The
idea of equal opportunities has been worked out in a very promising direction. A
rapidly growing literature explores different axiomatic structures for inequality
measurement,focusing also on the case of heterogeneous households. While there is
a wide variety of such new social choice approaches, in general they all depart from
traditional welfare economics. Yet at the same time they have come much closer to
the ideas of Mr. Fairmind.
This offers new possibilities for more and better communication between empirical
and theoretical work on distributive justice. Empirical research can never be a sub-
stitute for critical reflection. The opinions of uninformed respondents are often
incoherentandincomplete. However,theempiricalresultsmayenrichthetheoretical
debate by bringing in new arguments. In some cases they can give a more concrete
content to an abstract philosophical framework: the determination of variables for
which persons are to be held responsible in the equal opportunities approach is an
obvious example. Finally, they can also help in making theorists more aware of the
danger of partiality, following from the cultural and social bias, the contextual bias
and the formalistic bias. The most important empirical contributions (on welfarism
by Yaari and Bar-Hillel [1984] and on inequality measurement by Amiel and Cowell26.
[1992])haveplayedexactlythisroleofeye-opener. Otherresearchhasconfirmedthat
the recent post-welfarist developments are more in line with the intuitions of unin-
formed respondents. For those who prefer an Aristotelian approach to distributive
justice, this is a definite improvement.
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